Velocity-enhanced Cooperation of Moving Agents playing Public Goods
  Games by Cardillo, A. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
20
3.
17
68
v2
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  2
7 J
un
 20
12
Velocity-enhanced Cooperation of Moving Agents playing Public Goods Games
Alessio Cardillo,1, 2 Sandro Meloni,1 Jesu´s Go´mez-Garden˜es,1, 2 and Yamir Moreno1, 3
1Instituto de Biocomputacio´n y F´ısica de Sistemas Complejos,
Universidad de Zaragoza, E-50018 Zaragoza, Spain.
2Departamento de F´ısica de la Materia Condensada,
Universidad de Zaragoza, E-50009 Zaragoza, Spain.
3Departamento de F´ısica Teo´rica, Universidad de Zaragoza, E-50009 Zaragoza, Spain.
(Dated: November 15, 2018)
In this paper we study the evolutionary dynamics of the Public Goods Game in a population of
mobile agents embedded in a 2-dimensional space. In this framework, the backbone of interactions
between agents changes in time, allowing us to study the impact that mobility has on the emergence
of cooperation in structured populations. Our results point out that a low degree of mobility
enhances cooperation in the system. In addition, we study the impact of the size of the groups in
which games are played on cooperation. Again we find a rise-and-fall of cooperation related to the
percolation point of the instant interaction networks created by the set of mobile agents.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Ge
Despite its ubiquity in nature and human societies, the
survival of cooperative behavior among unrelated agents
(from bacteria to humans) when defection is the most ad-
vantageous strategy is not fully understood and consti-
tutes one of the most fascinating theoretical challenges of
Evolutionary Theory [1, 2]. Recently, it has been pointed
out that the integration of the microscopic patterns of
interactions among the agents composing a large popula-
tion into the evolutionary setting provides a way out for
cooperation to survive in paradigmatic scenarios such as
the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game [3–5]. The structural
features studied span from simple regular lattices [6–8]
to real patterns displayed by social networks [9], such as
the small-world effect [10], scale-free (SF) patterns for the
number of contacts per individual [11–15], the presence
of clustering [16, 17] or modularity [18].
Although the above studies mostly focus on the PD
game, other paradigmatic settings have also been studied
on top of network substrates, such as the Public Goods
Game. The Public Goods Game (PGG) is seen as the
natural extension of a PD game when passing from pair-
wise to n-person games. After the work by Santos et al.
[19] showing that SF architectures promote cooperation,
many other works have continued this line of research
by exploring the networked version of the PGG [20–26].
Moreover, as the PGG formulation introduces two struc-
tural scales, namely individuals and the groups within
which they interact, it has been shown that the struc-
ture of the mesoscale defined by the groups also play an
important role for the success of cooperation [27–30].
The assumption of a static graph that maps social ties,
although still a coarse grained picture of the microscopic
interactions, provides with a useful approach for study-
ing the dynamics of large social systems. However, when
moving to smaller scales one has to consider additional
microscopic ingredients that may influence the collective
outcome of social dynamics. One of these ingredients is
the mobility of individuals, a topic that has recently at-
tracted a lot of attention, and that has been tackled from
different perspectives. The range of studies in which mo-
bile agents have been included spans from pure empiri-
cal studies [31–33], to theoretical ones that focus on the
role that mobility patterns have on different dynamical
processes such as disease spreading [34], synchronization
[35, 36] and evolutionary dynamics [37–42] in the context
of the PD game. In addition, more complex representa-
tions in which an entanglement between agents mobility
and evolutionary dynamics is introduced have been stud-
ied within the framework of the PD game [43–46] and,
more recently, in the context of the PGG [47].
In this Brief Report we follow the setting introduced
in [37] in which a population of N agents moves on a
2-dimensional space. Simultaneously to the movement of
the agents we consider that a PGG is played. To this end,
the movement dynamics is frozen at equally spaced time
steps and each node engages its closest neighbors to par-
ticipate in a group in which a PGG is played. Obviously,
the mobility of individuals turns the usual static back-
bone of interactions into a time-evolving one, opening
the door to novel effects on the evolution of cooperation.
Our results point out a non-trivial dependence on the
velocity of the agents and the group size in which PGG
are played, yielding optimum operation points at which
cooperation is favored.
We start by introducing the dynamical setting in which
the evolutionary dynamics of the PGG is implemented.
Our population is composed of a set of N agents living
in the area inside a square with side length L. Thus,
the density of individuals is defined as ρ = N/L2. Both
the density and the number of agents remain constant
along our simulations. Our agents are initially scattered
at random on top of the surface by using two indepen-
dent random variables uniformly distributed in [0, L] for
assigning the initial position [xi(0), yi(0)] of each agent.
Once the initial configuration of the system is set, two
dynamical processes co-evolve: movement and evolution-
ary dynamics. At each time step t, the movement of
agents affects their current positions, [xi(t), yi(t)] with
2i = 1, ..., N , by means of the following equations:
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + v · cos θi(t) , (1)
yi(t+ 1) = yi(t) + v · sin θi(t) . (2)
The value of each angular variable, θi, is randomly as-
signed for each agent at each time step from a uniform
distribution in the interval [−pi, pi]. In addition to the
above equations, we use periodic boundary conditions so
if one agent reaches one side of the square, it re-appears
on the opposite one.
The second ingredient of the dynamical model is the
evolutionary PGG played by the mobile agents. In ad-
dition to the random assignment of its initial position,
each agent is assigned its initial strategy randomly, so
that with equal probability an agent is set as Coopera-
tor [si(0) = 1] or Defector [si(0) = 0]. After this ini-
tial stage, both movement and evolutionary dynamics
evolve simultaneously. At each time step, just after each
agent has updated its position in the plane as dictated
by Eqs. (1) and (2), agents play a round of the PGG
as follows. First a network of contacts is constructed as
a Random Geometric Graph (RGG) [9]. Each pair of
agents, (i, j), creates a link between them provided they
are separated less than a certain threshold distance, R:√
(xi(t)− xj(t))2 + (yi(t)− yj(t))2 ≤ R. After all the
nodes have stablished their connections with their near-
est neighbors, a RGG for the network of contacts at time
t emerges, whose topology is encoded in an adjacency
matrix, Atij , with entries A
t
ij = 1 when nodes i and j are
connected at time t and Atij = 0 otherwise.
Once the RGG is formed, each of the agents defines,
together with her ki nearest neighbors in the RGG, a
group of size ki+1 in which one PGG is played. In each
of the groups she participates in, a cooperator player con-
tributes an amount c while a defector does not contribute.
Besides, the total contribution of a group is multiplied by
an enhancing factor r and distributed equally among all
the participants. Thus the total payoff accumulated by
an agent i at time t reads:
Pi(t)=
N∑
j=1
(Atij+δij)
∑N
l=1(A
t
jl + δjl)sl(t)cr
kj(t) + 1
−[ki(t)+1]si(t)c .
(3)
After each round each of the agents can update her
strategy. To this aim, an agent i chooses one of her
instant neighbors j at random and with probability
Π[si(t + 1) = sj(t)], i will take the strategy of j dur-
ing the next round of the PGG. The former probability
reads:
Π[si(t+ 1) = sj(t)] =
Θ[Pj(t)− Pi(t)]
M [ki(t), kj(t)]
, (4)
where Θ(x) = x when x > 0 while Θ(x) = 0 other-
wise, and M(ki, kj) is the maximum possible payoff dif-
ference between two players with instant degres ki(t)
and kj(t). In our simulations, we let co-evolve both
movement and evolutionary dynamics during 5 ·104 time
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FIG. 1: (color online) Average fraction of cooperators 〈c〉
with respect to the enhancement factor r forstatic RGG and
ER networks. Both networks have the same number of nodes
N = 1000 and average degree 〈k〉 = 6.
steps. We take the first 25 · 103 steps as a transient pe-
riod while the degree of cooperation of the system is
measured during the second half of the simulations as
〈c〉 = ∑τ+Tt=τ
∑N
i=1 si(t)/T , with both τ = T = 25 · 103.
The results reported below are averaged over different
realizations (typically 50).
We start our analysis by considering the static case in
which the velocity of the agents is set to v = 0. In this
case, the RGG is fixed from the initial configuration while
only the strategies of agents evolve. A RGG is described
by a Poissonian distribution, P (k) = 〈k〉ke−〈k〉/k!, for
the probability of finding a node connected to k neigh-
bors. This distribution corresponds to a homogeneous
architecture in which the dispersion around the mean de-
gree, 〈k〉, is rather small. The same pattern for the degree
distribution P (k) is obtained for the typical Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
random network model. However, the main differences
between RGG and ER networks relies on the clustering
coefficient, i.e. the probability that two nodes with a
common neighbor share a connection, and their diame-
ter. While in the case of ER graphs clustering vanishes
as N → ∞, the geometric nature of RGG boosts the
density of triads leading to a finite and large cluster-
ing coefficient at the expense of being longer than ER
graphs (since redundant links used to increase clustering
do not contribute to create short-cuts). These differences
are found to be relevant for the synchronization of RGG
compared to ER graphs [48].
The results of the above analysis are shown in Fig. 1
where we represent the dependency of the average level
of cooperation in the system 〈c〉 with respect to the en-
hancement factor, r, for both RGG and ER graphs hav-
ing the same number of elements N and the same average
degrees 〈k〉. As expected, for low values of r defection
dominates the system while for large r cooperation pre-
vails. Between these two asymptotic regimes the transi-
tion from defection to cooperation occurs (5 ≤ r ≤ 8)
pointing out slight differences between RGG and ER
graphs. In this region we observe that ER networks
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FIG. 2: (color online) Effects of velocity on the promotion of
cooperation. (a) Average level of cooperation 〈c〉 as a function
of the velocity v of agents. The system has ρ = 2.0 and
R = 1.0 and the enhancement factor r is set to r = 5.75. The
velocity spans in the interval
[
10−5; 10−1
]
. The dashed line
represents 〈c〉 in a static RGG with the same N and 〈k〉, and
for the same value of r. (b) Cooperation level 〈c〉 as a function
of v and r. The static case is displayed in the bottom strip of
the panel (below the continuous thick band).
promote cooperation slightly more than RGG for which
the transition curve towards full cooperation goes slower.
This result seems to contradict previous observations in
the context of PD game [17] in SF networks. However,
this latter result is related to the increase of heterogeneity
when clustering is enlarged in SF networks. In our case,
this effect is not present and, alternatively, clustering in-
duces important differences between ER and RGG re-
garding the average path length. This quantity is shown
to be much larger in RGG than in ER graphs, thus mak-
ing more difficult the percolation of cooperation in the
whole system. On the other hand, the onset of both
transitions are roughly the same.
We now focus on the impact that the motion of agents
has on the level of cooperation with respect to the static
case. Thus, from now on, we consider that agents move
with constant velocity v following the rules given by Eqs.
(1) and (2). Moreover, we set the value of the enhance-
ment factor r to be in the region for which the transition
from full defection to cooperation occurs in the static
case, namely r = 5.75. Then, we monitor the degree of
cooperation 〈c〉 in the system as a function of the velocity
The results are shown in Fig. 2a together with the value
(dashed line) for 〈c〉 in the static limit with r = 5.75. We
observe a rise-and-fall of cooperation so that when the
velocity v increases from very small values, the average
level of cooperation increases significantly, reaching its
maximum value for v ≃ 2 · 10−2. From this point on, the
increase of v leads to the decay of cooperation so that
〈c〉 = 0 beyond v ≃ 10−1. The fall of cooperation for
large values of the velocity of agents is a quite expected
result: as the velocity increases one approaches the well-
mixed scenario for which cooperation is suppressed pro-
vided r is less than the typical size of groups in which the
PGG is played (here 〈k〉 = 6 so that groups are typically
composed by 7 agents). The rise of cooperation for small
values of v points out that there exists an optimal range
for the velocity that allows a trade-off between two im-
portant ingredients for cooperator clusters to form and
resist the invasion of defectors, namely: the ability to
explore the plane to find other cooperators and a large
enough time to interact with them so as to allow for the
growth of cohesive cooperator clusters.
A more extensive analysis on the effects of motion is
found in Fig. 2b where a detailed exploration of the (v, r)-
parameter space is shown together with the cooperation
level in the static case (bottom part of the panel) as ob-
tained from the corresponding curve in Fig. 1. This panel
confirms the results obtained in Fig. 2a and provides a
more complete picture about the enhancement of coop-
eration produced by the mobility of agents. First, by
comparing the bottom (v = 0) and top (v = 10−1) parts
of the panel, we observe that a large value of the velocity
decreases the cooperation level of the static system. In
particular, let us note that the transition region in the
limit of large velocity is placed around r ≃ 7 thus recov-
ering the well-mixed prediction. However, the relevant
results are found between the static and large velocity
limits. The effects of mobility in this region affect both
the onset of the transition towards cooperation and its
fixation. First, we observe that even for very low values
of v the onset of cooperation is anticipated with respect
to the static case at the expense of having a broader
transition towards full-cooperation as compared to the
static RGG. However, when the velocity level is further
increased, the transition becomes sharper and both the
onset and the fixation of the full-cooperative state occur
before with respect to the static case.
Finally, we focus on the influence of group size in the
evolutionary success of cooperation. Considering a fixed
velocity lying in the region for which the increase of co-
operation is observed, namely v = 10−2, we compute
the level of cooperation 〈c〉 as a function of the re-scaled
enhancement factor, η = r/(〈k〉 + 1), where the denomi-
nator is the average size of the groups. This re-scaling is
needed for the sake of comparing the cooperation levels
for systems in which the group size is different. In this
way, the well-mixed prediction is a sharp transition from
full defection to full cooperation at η = 1. As anticipated
above, the size of the groups can be written as ρpiR2+1,
thus we can vary both the radius of interaction R or the
density of agents ρ.
In what follows we vary the radius and keep the density
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FIG. 3: (color online) Cooperation level 〈c〉 as a function of
η = r/(〈k〉 + 1) varying the interaction radius of the agents
(i.e. the size of the groups). In all the cases the density of
players is ρ = 2.0 and their velocity is v = 10−2.
constant to ρ = 2. In Fig. 3 we observe that, again, a
rise-and-fall of cooperation is observed when going from
low radius to large ones. Obviously, as radius (and hence
group size) increases, we approach the well-mixed case
so that the transition point reaches the theoretical value
η = 1. However, this approach is not monotonous and for
intermediate values of the radius and group size the co-
operation transition is anticipated with respect to lower
values of R. The reason behind this behavior relies on
the percolation of the effective network when increasing
the radius of influence of each agent. For low values of
R the effective network of contacts contains a number of
disconnected clusters, however reaching the percolation
threshold (meaning that the 〈k〉 = ρpiR2 > 2) nearly
all the agents are incorporated into a macroscopic giant
component. In our case ρ = 2 so that the percolation
point lies around R ≃ √pi ≃ 1.773 which agrees with the
numerical observation in Fig. 3. This connection with
the percolation point and the cooperation level has been
recently observed in [49] in the context of the PD game
in regular lattices.
Summing up, the results presented in this Brief Report
show that the mobility of the agents playing a PGG en-
hances cooperation provided their velocity is moderate.
This enhancement is obtained by comparing the outcome
of the evolutionary dynamics of the PGG with the results
obtained in the static case. The addition of the random
movement of agents produces the evolution in time of the
original RGG, being the rate of creation and deletion of
links controlled by the velocity of agents. When this rate
is non-zero, allowing cooperators to explore the space,
while moderate, so that cooperators clusters can be effi-
ciently formed, we observe an optimal operation regime
in which both the onset of cooperation and the fixation of
cooperation in the system are enhanced. Finally, we have
checked that group size shows a similar resonance phe-
nomenon regarding the level of cooperation. However, in
this case the point at which cooperation is enhanced is
related to the percolation point of the effective network,
i.e. with the point at which the size of the groups is large
enough so as to have a macroscopic giant component for
the network of contacts.
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